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NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE: SHOULD AN ADVISORY
OPINION BRING THEM TOGETHER?
I. INTRODUCTION
In its press release of September 3, 1993, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ)' announced that the World Health Organization (WHO)2 had requested
an advisory opinion3 from the ICJ concerning the legality of nuclear weapons.4
The WHO is a specialized United Nations agency5 under the auspices of
1. "The International Court of Justice, which has its seat in The Hague, is the principal judicial organ
of the United Nations." Introduction, 1991-1992 ICI Y.B. No. 46, at 1 (1992). The ICJ was preceded by the
Permanent Court of International Justice which "began its work on December 15, 1922 in The Hague and
ceased to exist formally on December 31, 1945." THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 688 (Edmund Jan Osmaficzyk ed., 2d ed. 1990).
"Article 92 [of the United Nations Charter] states that the Court shall be the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations, and that it shall function in accordance with" the provision of the Statute. SHABTAI
ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT; WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 27 (1973).
2. The World Health Organization is:
the largest of all the organisations in terms of staff and budget. It coordinates research in a very
large number of areas; it runs a system for the notification of various especially infectious diseases
such as cholera, and for preventing their transmission, once notified; it helps developing countries
organise their own health services and to train doctors and nurses and especially to improve their
public health facilities; it launches world-wide campaigns against particular diseases, such as
smallpox (now almost eliminated) and malaria (successful in some areas but often recurring unless
public health standards have been sufficiently raised first).
EVAN LUARD, THE UNITED NATIONS: How IT WORKS AND WHAT IT DOES 70 (1979).
3. The WHO had asked for only one advisory opinion prior to the present one. In May of 1980, the
WHO asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion concerning the interpretation of an agreement between Egypt and
the WHO. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 1980 ICJ
Pleadings VII.
4. ICJ Communiqu6 No. 93/26 (1993).
5. "The Contracting Parties agree to the present Constitution and hereby establish the World Health
Organization as a specialized agency within the terms of art. 57 of the Charter of the United Nations." WHO
CONST. pmbl. reprinted in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
1035 (Edmund Jan Osmaticzyk ed., 2d ed. 1990).
Under Article 62, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter,
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the Economic and Social Council.6 The WHO's main objective is "the
attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health."7 Functions of
the WHO include acting as the directing and co-ordinating authority on
international health work;8 establishing and maintaining effective collaboration
with the United Nations, specialized agencies, governmental health administra-
tions, professional groups, and such other organizations as may be deemed
appropriate.9 Other functions of the WHO involve stimulating and advancing
work to eradicate epidemic, endemic, and other diseases; ° and providing
information, counsel, and assistance in the field of health." The WHO
performs its function via resolutions passed by the World Health Assembly
(Health Assembly), the governing body of the WHO.12 While the list of the
WHO's accomplishments in furtherance of its objective 3 is impressive, it is the
WHO's work regarding nuclear weapons, culminating with its request for an
advisory opinion 4 from the ICJ, that is the focus of this comment. To justify
its request, the WHO has published several reports and cited numerous
authorities. This comment will examine the events leading to the WHO's
request, the WHO's competence to make such a request, and the possible
repercussions of the ICJ's pending decision on whether to grant the request.
[t]he Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to
international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make
recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of the
United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.
U.N. CHARTER art. 62, para. 1, reprinted in LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCuMENTS 370 (2d & rev. ed. 1949).
6. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) "comprises fifty-four states elected by the General
Assembly. Many non-governmental organizations also participate in its proceedings. It supervises the work
of numerous commissions, committees, and expert bodies in the economic and social fields, and endeavours
to coordinate the efforts of the U.N. specialized agencies in this area." ADAM ROBERTS & BENEDICT
KINGSBURY, UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD; THE U.N.'s ROLEs IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 7 (1988).
7. WHO CONST. art. 1, reprinted in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 1035 (Edmund Jan Osmaliczyk ed., 2d ed. 1990).
8. Id. art. 2(a), at 1035.
9. Id. art. 2(b), at 1035.
10. Id. art. 2 (g), at 1035.
11. Id. art. 2(q), at 1035.
12. Id. arts. 9, 24, at 1035, 1036.
13. LUARD, supra note 2, at 169.
14. There are actually two types of advisory opinions the ICJ may give, depending upon the active
participants in the advisory opinion process.
The objective of the procedure can be purely advisory, which in fact is the only possibility foreseen
in the Statute. But under certain provisions, designed for the purpose, that are contained in
instruments other than the Charter and the Statute and were adopted separately by the United Nations
itself or other institutions within the U.N. system, resort to the procedure may pursue a more
ambitious aim, namely, to settle a dispute to which one of those institutions is a party.
Roberto Ago, Binding Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice, 85 AM. J. INrL L. 439 (1991).
However, the reply the ICJ gives when asked to give an advisory opinion is that the advisory opinion has
no binding force because of its advisory character. Id. at 441. With regard to the WHO's request for an
advisory opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, there are no other named parties to the request
who have agreed to be bound by the opinion; therefore, the opinion will not be binding.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WHO
II. THE WHO REPORTS ON NUCLEAR WAR
A. Report of The International Committee of Experts in Medical Sciences
and Public Health To Implement Resolution WHA34.38
In 1984, the WHO published a report on "The Effects of Nuclear War on
Health and Health Services pursuant to WHA34.38."' 5  As a basis for the
report, the Committee of Experts in Medical Sciences and Public Health
(Committee) considered three hypothetical scenarios:
(1) The detonation of a 1-megaton bomb over a large city would kill more than 1.5
million people and injure as many.
(2) "Limited" nuclear war with smaller tactical nuclear weapons totalling 20
megatons, aimed at military targets in a relatively densely populated area, would
exact a toll of about 9 million dead and seriously injured, of whom more than 8
million would be civilians.
(3) An all-out nuclear war using at least half of the estimated present stockpiles
of nuclear weapons (an approximate total of 10,000 megatons) would result in more
than 1000 million deaths and 1000 million injured people.'6
After completing staggering amounts of research, the Committee reported
that "no health service in any area of the world would be capable of dealing
adequately with the hundreds of thousands of people seriously injured by blast,
heat, or radiation from even a single 1-megaton bomb" (first scenario)."
Further, the Committee found that "[ilt is difficult to comprehend the catastroph-
ic consequences and the human suffering that would result from the effects of
nuclear explosions in the second and third scenarios. . ." and that "[wihatever
remained of the medical services in the world could not alleviate the disaster in
any significant way."'"
The Committee concluded that the only approach to prevent nuclear
explosions and their devastating consequences was the prevention of nuclear
war. 9 The Committee also found that the political steps towards this end were
not within the purview of the Committee or the WHO. Specifically, the
15. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ON HEALTH AND HEALTH SERVICES:
REPORT OF THE WHO MANAGEMENT GROUP ON FOLLow-up OF RESOLUTION WHA36.28: "THE ROLE OF
PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH WORKERS IN THE PRESERVATION AND PROMOTION OF PEACE..." 1 (2d ed.
1987) [hereinafter WHO MANAGEMENT GROUP REPORT].
In resolution WHA34.38 the World Health Assembly requested the Director-General of WHO to
create a committee to study the contribution WHO could make to implementation of the United
Nations resolutions on strengthening peace, detente, and disarmament, and preventing thermonuclear
conflict. In response to that resolution the Director-General set up an international committee of
experts in medical sciences and public health, which met in 1982 and 1983 and submitted a report
on the effects of nuclear war on health and health services that was presented to the World Health
Assembly in 1983 and later published [EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ON HEALTH AND HEALTH
SERVICES].
Id.
16. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ON HEALTH AND HEALTH SERVICES:
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITrEE OF EXPERTs IN MEDICAL SCIENCES AND PUBLIC HEALTH TO
IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION WHA34.38 at 5, 1 3 (1st ed. 1984) [hereinafter WHO EXPERTS REPORT].
17. Id. at 5, 4.
18. I at 6,13.
19. Id. at 6, 1 7.
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Committee stated that "it is not for the group to outline the political steps by
which this threat can be removed or the preventive therapy implemented."
2
The Committee did, however, outline the proper involvement of the WHO in
preventing nuclear warfare as "systematically distributing information on the
health consequences of atomic warfare and by continuing and expanding
international cooperation in the field of health.'
2
'
B. Report of the WHO Management Group on Follow-up of Resolution
WHA36.28: "The Role of Physicians and Other Health Workers in the
Preservation and Promotion of Peace.... "
In WHA36.28, the WHA endorsed the Committee's conclusions in the 1983
report and recommended ongoing studies on the effects of nuclear war.' The
result of WHA36.28 was an update of the 1983 report compiled and published
by the WHO Management Group in 1987.23 In the 1987 report, the Manage-
ment Group revisited the devastating effects of nuclear war and added new
studies on both the short and long term effects of radiation and fallout.' The
Management Group found that "[tihe many individual fires caused by the heat
wave would result in huge superfires that could spread widely" and "[i]n such
a conflagration no one would survive, even in underground shelters."'  Finally,
the Management Group concluded that famine and disease would be widespread
and the world's health services would be unable to alleviate the situation.26
The Management Group, using the same language as the Committee in the 1983
report, reiterated that the political steps towards the prevention of nuclear war
were not within the province of the Management Group.27
The Management Group, however, made a highly significant change to the
role the WHO should take in the sphere of nuclear war prevention.28  The
change was grammatical in nature but had an extremely far-reaching purpose.
In the 1987 report, the clause "and intensifying" was added before "international
cooperation" for an intentionally prescribed effect.29 Can it be supposed that
between the reports of 1983 and 1987 the WHO's function changed from a
20. WHO MANAGEMENT GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 5, 8.
21. Id.
22. 'The Health Assembly endorsed the committee's conclusions in resolution WHA36.28 and
recommended that WHO should continue to collect, analyse, and regularly publish accounts of activities and
further studies of the effects of nuclear war on health and health services, and keep the Health Assembly
periodically informed." Id.
23. "Rather than present fragmentary information on the new studies that have been carried out, the Group
considered it preferable to submit a revised version of the 1983 report [published in 1984], incorporating the
results of the new studies carried out since that date." Id.
24. WHO MANAGEMENT GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 5, 1 2.
25. Id. at 5, 3.
26. Id. at 5, 9M 5, 6.
27. The only difference between the language in the first and second reports is that the word "Committee"
in the first report was replaced by the word "Group" in the second report. Compare WHO EXPERTS REPORT,
supra note 16, at 6, 1 8 with WHO MANAGEMENT GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 5, 9.
28. The substitution of the word "nuclear" in the second report for the word "atomic" has no effect on
the substantive meaning of the sentence as alluded to here. Compare WHO EXPERTS REPORT, supra note 16,
at 6, 8 with WHO MANAGEMENT GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 5, 9.
29. WHO MANAGEMENT GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 6, 9.
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"health organization" in charge of distributing information to a "political
organization" in charge of "intensifying international cooperation" in the health
field?
The language indicates that the WHO's new role in preventing nuclear war
was to go beyond the limits of the 1983 report and work to intensify internation-
al cooperation for the prevention of nuclear war. While this language could
arguably be restricted to health matters, the WHO has necessarily identified the
possibility of nuclear war as a health matter in both reports.
I. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND WHA46.40
The World Health Assembly (Health Assembly) is divided into committees
which meet separately and report back to the Health Assembly. The future of
the WHO's continued involvement in the issue of nuclear war, among other
issues, was assigned to Committee B at the Forty-Sixth World Health Assembly
in May of 1993 in Geneva?"
A. The Eighth Meeting of Committee B
During its eighth meeting of 1993, Committee B was given a draft
resolution for a proposed WHO request to the ICJ for an advisory opinion.3'
The meeting was addressed by Dr. Piel (Legal Counsel for the WHO) who
recapitulated the findings of the two reports on nuclear war.32 In his report to
the Committee, Dr. Piel emphasized the following:
The United Nations General Assembly had already dealt with the question [of the
legality of the use of nuclear weapons] and had provided the following answer in
its resolution 33n/lB (1978), where it declared that "the use of nuclear weapons
[would] be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against
humanity. 3
3
Dr. Piel apparently felt that the General Assembly's answer was not enough,
standing alone, to curtail the tide of increasing nuclear arsenals. Dr. Piel
proposed a WHO declaration condemning the use of nuclear weapons in an
armed conflict as a violation of the spirit and objective of the WHO and the
WHO Constitution. 4 He then concluded that a declaration of that nature, in
conjunction with a United Nations General Assembly Resolution, might negate
the need for referring the issue to the ICJ. 35 Dr. Piel then posed the question:
"Should not the task of deciding whether an advisory opinion on the 'illegality'
issue was needed be that of the United Nations General Assembly, rather than
the Health Assembly?, 36 This proved to be quite an intriguing question.
30. FORTY-SIXTH WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY: SUMMARY RECORDS AND REPORTS OF COMMITrEES, Doc.
a46/30, Geneva, 257-69 (1993) [hereinafter FORTY-SIXTH WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY].
31. Id. at 257-58.
32. Id. at 258. See also supra notes 15 &16.
33. FoRTY-SIXTH WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY, supra note 30, at 258.
34. Id. The proposed declaration stated: "In view of the health and environmental effects, the unjustified
use of nuclear weapons by a State in armed conflict would be contrary to the spirit and health objective of
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Later in the eighth meeting, opposing members were concerned that asking
for an advisory opinion from the ICJ involving the legality of nuclear weapons
could be damaging to the WHO. It could be seen as "a political act outside the
mandate of the WHO."''3  Mr. Boyer, the U.S. delegate to the meeting, was one
of those opposing the adoption of the resolution requesting an advisory
38opinion. Mr. Boyer indicated that by asking for an advisory opinion, the
WHO would be abandoning its right to come to a conclusion on nuclear
weapons. He also contended that the draft resolution was not within the
competence of the WHO.39
The right to "come to a conclusion," referred to by Mr. Boyer, parallels Dr.
Piel's proposal of a declaration by the WHO condemning the use of nuclear
weapons. Dr. Piel suggested that a WHO declaration, condemning the use of
nuclear weapons as a violation of the spirit and health objective of the WHO and
its Constitution, would have been the appropriate action to take as opposed to the
request for an advisory opinion.40
B. The Ninth and Tenth Meetings of Committee B
On May 12, 1993, Committee B convened for their ninth meeting which
began with the issue of the draft resolution discussed in the eighth meeting.41
Mr. Boyer, as he had done in the eighth meeting, made a motion against the
draft resolution insisting that it was not within the WHO's competence. The
motion was rejected after a vote by secret ballot.42
Dr. Piel attended the tenth meeting of Committee B as Legal Counsel for
the WHO. He responded to questions that were asked in earlier meetings and
concluded that while the WHO was entitled to ask the ICJ for advisory
opinions, 43 it was restricted to requesting advisory opinions on issues falling
within the WHO's competence. 44 Dr. Piel previously concluded at the eighth
meeting that the United Nations had already considered the issue in resolution
37. FoRTY-SIXTH WoRLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY, supra note 30, at 259.
38. Id. at 260. It is surprising Mr. Boyer did not have a greater effect in blocking the draft resolution
considering the strong economic power of the United States in the WHO.
In specialized agencies, as in the United Nations itself, the United States used its financial clout to
block programs it opposed. In the World Health Organization (W.H.O.), the U.S. threatened to
withhold its dues if Palestine were admitted as a member state. Yassir Arafat, the Chairman of the
PLO, called the threat 'blackmail,' as the U.S. then contributed one fourth of W.H.O.'s budget. The
W.H.O. Director General, fearful over the loss of revenue, asked the PLO to withdraw its application.
Ultimately the W.H.O. voted to postpone the application, primarily because of the United States
pressure.
John Quigley, The New World Order and the Rule of Law, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 75, 85 (1992).
39. FORTY-SIxTH WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY, supra note 30, at 260.
40. Id. at 258.
41. Id. at 263.
42. Id. at 264.
43. Dr. Piel cited Article 76 of the World Health Organization Constitution, Article 92 of the United
Nations Charter, and Article X of the Agreement between the United Nations and the WHO as authority for
the WHO's legal authorization to ask for advisory opinions from the ICJ. FORTY-SIXTH WORLD HEALTH
ASSEMBLY, supra note 30, at 265.
44. Id.
[Vol. 2:395
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WHO
33/7lB (1978) and decided that nuclear weapons were illegal.45 Finally, Dr.
Piel advised: (1) the determination of the legality or illegality of nuclear weapons
was squarely within the mandate of the United Nations; (2) it was not legally
within the mandate of the WHO to refer the "illegality" issue to the ICJ; and (3)
the proper approach was for the Health Assembly to consider the question and
refer it, via the General Assembly, to the ICJ. 6 Therefore, according to Dr.
Piel, the Health Assembly had two legal avenues to pursue with regard to the
legality of nuclear weapons.
The first alternative would be for the Health Assembly to declare the use
of nuclear weapons a clear violation of the WHO Constitution as contrary to the
spirit of its health objective. Pursuing this alternative would require no outside
contact with the United Nations from a procedural point of view. In other
words, the Health Assembly could make this declaration independently.47 The
second alternative would be for the Health Assembly to refer the question of the
legality of nuclear weapons, through the General Assembly, to the ICJ, "thus
respecting the legal mandate of the United Nations ....
The only other alternative was not considered legal by Dr. Piel. This would
be for the WHO to directly ask the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the legality
of the use of nuclear weapons. Once again, as in the eighth meeting, this idea
was met with opposition. Mrs. Lini, a delegate from Vanuatu,4 9 stated that the
"relevant United Nations General Assembly resolution on the use of nuclear
weapons had not been widely respected."5 Further, Mrs. Lini took notice of
Great Britain's position that there was no need for an advisory opinion from the
ICJ because the Non-Proliferation Treaty explicitly allowed the possession of
nuclear weapons by countries already possessing them.51
As expected, Mr. Boyer reiterated the United States' position that it was not
within the mandate of the WHO to ask for such an advisory opinion.
Notwithstanding the positions taken by Mrs. Lini and Mr. Boyer, the resolution
was approved.52 Once the draft resolution was approved, it was sent to the
Health Assembly where it was adopted 53 and forwarded to the ICJ on August
27, 19 9 3 .5
The request was directed to the Registrar of the International Court of
Justice from the Director-General of the World Health Organization and read as
follows:
45. Id. at 258.
46. Id. at 265.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Mrs. Lini was an original sponsor of the draft resolution; however, she felt that the proposed
amendments to the draft should not have been accepted. FoRTY-SIXTH WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY, supra note
30, at 266.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 268.
52. The vote count was as follows: Members entitled to vote- 164; absent- 54; abstentions- 6; papers null
and void- 0; votes in favor- 73; votes against- 31; simple majority- 53. Id.
53. Id at n.1.
54. IC Communiqu6 No. 93/26 (1993).
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Pursuant to resolution WHA46.40 adopted by the World Health Assembly on 14
May 1993, and in accordance with Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the
United Nations, Article 76 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization,
and Article X, paragraph 2, of the agreement between the United Nations and the
World Health Organization, I have the honour to lay before
the International Court of Justice for its advisory opinion the following question:
In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear
weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its
obligations under international law including the WHO Constitution?"
IV. WHO COMPETENCE TO REQUEST ADVISORY OPINIONS
To better understand the legal position of the WHO regarding this specific
request to the ICJ, an examination of the WHO's competency for any request to
the ICJ is necessary. To do this, each authority cited by the Director-General in
the previous request must be reviewed.
A. Article 96, Paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter
Article 96, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter states: "Other organs
of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so
authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the
,"56Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities. The
wording of the paragraph has been viewed to give the specialized agencies a
"general" authorization to ask for advisory opinions from the court at any time,
as long as the request falls within the scope of the activities of the specialized
agencies.57 In order to clarify the "general" authorization conferred on the
specialized agencies by the General Assembly, a resolution was adopted
authorizing the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) "to request advisory
opinions of the International Court of Justice on legal questions arising within
the scope of the activities of the Council.""8
Agreements between the ECOSOC and the specialized agencies granted the
WHO authority to ask for advisory opinions from the ICJ.59  The WHO has
previously used this 9ower only once, concerning the interpretation of the 1951
WHO-Egypt Treaty. In that case, the WHO wanted to move its Eastern
55. The request for the advisory opinion was supported by materials including: WHA46.40, Article 96,
1 2 of the United Nations Charter, Article 76 of the WHO Constitution, Article X of the Agreement between
the United Nations and the WHO, and the documents and records of the Forty-Sixth World Health Assembly
(including the records of Committee B). Il
56. U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 2 (emphasis added).
57. GOODRICH, supra note 5. at 489.
The text does not make it clear whether the authorization is to be specific or general. The logic of
experience would seem to indicate that the authorization should be general. Committee action at San
Francisco supports this interpretation.... In practice, the authorizations that have been given have




60. The advisory opinion, requested by the WHO in 1980, was only the third advisory opinion ever
requested by a United Nations specialized agency and the first one requested by the WHO. Charles A.
Wintermeyer, Jr., ICJ Advisory Opinion: 1951 WHO-Egypt Treaty, 10 DFV. J. JNT' L. & POL'Y 561 (1980).
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Mediterranean Regional Office from Alexandria, Egypt, to Amman, Jordan, due
to the Accords Egypt had signed with Israel at Camp David.6 The ICJ advised
that the Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office could be transferred regardless
of the Accord, but the WHO had to give Egypt reasonable notice of the transfer
and negotiate in good faith to minimize Egypt's resulting damages. 62 In 1981,
as a result of the advisory opinion, the WHO adopted a resolution and moved its
office. 63
B. The Agreement Between the United Nations and the WHO
Another authority that must be reviewed to determine the competence of the
WHO is the Agreement Between the United Nations and the WHO (Agreement).
The Agreement was approved by the United Nations General Assembly on
November 15, 1947, and by the Health Assembly on July 10, 1948.' Article
X, paragraph 2 of the Agreement addresses the relationship between the United
Nations and the WHO. Paragraph 2 contains authorization from the General
Assembly allowing the WHO to request advisory opinions from the ICJ on "legal
questions arising within the scope of its competence other than questions
concerning mutual relationships of the Organization and the United Nations or
other specialized agencies. ' 65  Although Article X, paragraph 2 of the Agree-
ment appears to be a restatement of Article 96, paragraph 2 of the United
Nations Charter, there is an important distinction.
The Charter expressly allows specialized agencies to request advisory
opinions arising within the "scope of their activities." However, the Agreement
limits requests for advisory opinions from the WHO to questions arising within
See also supra note 3.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. WHA34.11, [as submitted to the ICJ for publication] concerning the ICJ advisory opinion on the
moving of the Eastern Regional Mediterranean Office stated:
Recalling resolution WHA33.16 deciding to submit to the International Court of Justice for its
Advisory Opinion certain questions before taking any decision on a transfer of the Regional Office
from Alexandria....
1. Thanks the International Court for its Advisory Opinion on the questions submitted to the
Court by the World Health Organization;
2. Accepts the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 20 December 1980 and
recommends to all parties concerned to be guided by it:
3. Requests the Director-General:
(a) to initiate action as contained in paragraph 51 of the Advisory Opinion and report the
results to the sixty-ninth session of the Executive Board in January 1982 for consideration
and recommendation to the Thirty-fifth World Health Assembly in May 1982;
(b) to continue to take whatever action he considers necessary to ensure the smooth
operations of the technical, administrative and managerial programmes of the Regional
Office for the Eastern Mediterranean Region during the period of consultation;
4. Requests the Government of Egypt to hold consultations with the Director-General as
mentioned above.
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 1980 ICJ Pleadings 139 (Dec.
20, 1980).
64. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the World Health Organization, Nov. 12, 1948, U.N.-
W.H.O., 19 U.N.T.S. 193.
65. Id. art. X, 1 2, at 202 (emphasis added).
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the "scope of its competence." The distinction may seem small; but, "scope of
their activities" may be viewed as a much broader description than "scope of its
competence." "Competent" is defined as: "Duly qualified; answering all
requirements; having sufficient capacity, ability or authority. . . ."' "Activity"
is defined as: "An occupation or pursuit in which [a] person is active."'67 The
United Nations Charter allows specialized agencies to request advisory opinions
regarding any pursuit in which the agency is active. However, the Agreement
limits the WHO's request to areas in which it is duly qualified. Therefore, it can
be argued that even though the WHO is duly qualified to request advisory
opinions from the ICJ with respect to health matters, the WHO is not duly
qualified to request advisory opinions concerning the legality of nuclear
weapons.
C. Article 76 of the WHO Constitution
The final authority that must be reviewed to determine the competence of
the WHO is Article 76 of the WHO Constitution. Article 76 of the WHO
Constitution is a simple restatement of the Agreement between the United
Nations and the WHO governing the WHO's ability to ask for an advisory
opinion from the ICJ.68 However, the Constitutional version of the ability to
request an advisory opinion is based on the wording of the Agreement not on the
wording of the Charter. Thus, requests for advisory opinions are limited to legal
questions arising within the "competence" of the WHO.
69
D. The Competence of the WHO
While the ability of the WHO to ask for an advisory opinion from the ICJ
can be narrowed to questions arising within its "competence,"7 the competence
of the WHO is the key to understanding whether the ICJ should give this
advisory opinion. There is no better place to begin a search for the WHO's
competence than with the WHO Constitution itself. In resolution WHA46.40,
the Health Assembly defined the role of the WHO using the relevant provisions
of the WHO Constitution.7'
The first role of the WHO, according to WHA46.40, is found in the
language of Article 2(a) of the WHO Constitution.72 According to Article 2(a),
the WHO is "to act as the directing and co-ordinating authority on international
66. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 195 (6th ed. 1991).
67. Id. at 21.
68. WHO CONST. art. 76, reprinted in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 1035, 1037 (Edmund Jan Osmahczyk ed., 2d ed. 1990).
69. Id.
70. In the WHO's only other request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ, there was no question as to
its competence to make the request. In that case, both parties were amenable to the court's jurisdiction and
the question involved a treaty between the WHO and Egypt which can easily be seen as within the WHO's
competence. See Wintermeyer, supra note 60.
71. FORTY-SIXTH WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY: RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS ANNEXES, WHA Res. 46.40,
at 44 (1993) [hereinafter WHA Res. 46.40].
72. Id.
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health work.'"73 However, nothing in the language of Article 2(a) indicates that
the WHO has the power to attempt to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by
requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ, even though the WHO regards
nuclear war primarily as a health issue.
The second role of the WHO according to WHA46.40 is found in the
language of Article 2(k) of the WHO Constitution.74 According to Article 2(k),
another function of the WHO is "to propose conventions, agreements and
regulations, and make recommendations with respect to international health
matters and to perform such duties as may be assigned thereby to the Organiza-
tion and are consistent with its objective., 75 The language does not suggest that
the WHO should determine the legality of any type of action. The language
seems, however, to limit the WHO to making proposals. The request for an
advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons use cannot be construed as
a "proposal" by the WHO. Under this section, there is no basis for the WHO's
request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ.
The third role of the WHO is derived from Article 2(p) of the WHO
Constitution.76 Section p describes another function of the WHO as the duty
"to study and report on, in co-operation with other specialized agencies where
necessary, administrative and social techniques affecting public health and
medical care from preventive and curative points of view, including hospital
services and social security., 77  This is the function of the WHO that best
relates the WHO's true competence with respect to nuclear weapons. It is the
WHO's function of studying and reporting that led to the request for the advisory
opinion. The studies conducted by the WHO on the "Effects of Nuclear War on
Health and Health Services' '78 were clearly within its mandate under this
section. However, there is nothing in the language of Article 2(p) indicating that
the WHO has competence to ask for an advisory opinion on the legality of the
use of nuclear weapons.
The final role of the WHO, according to WHA46.40, is an extremely vague
and broad function found in Article 2(v). 79  Article 2(v) recognizes that the
WHO function is "generally to take all necessary action to attain the objective
of the Organization."8 Again, the objective of the WHO is "the attainment by
all peoples of the highest possible level of health."'', According to the
ambiguous wording of Article 2(v), it could easily be argued that the WHO does
73. WHO CONST. art. 2, a, reprinted in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1035 (Edmund Jan Osmadczyk ed., 2d ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
74. WHA Res. 46.40, supra note 71.
75. WHO CONST. art. 2, k, reprinted in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1035 (Edmund Jan Osmaliczyk ed., 2d ed. 1990).
76. WHA Res. 46.40, supra note 71.
77. WHO CONST. art. 2, 1 p, reprinted in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1035 (Edmund Jan Osmadczyk ed., 2d ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
78. See supra notes 15 and 16.
79. WHA Res. 46.40, supra note 71.
80. WHO CONST. art. 2. v, reprinted in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1035 (Edmund Jan Osmahczyk ed., 2d ed. 1990).
81. WHO CONST. art. 1. reprinted in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 1035 (Edmund Jan Osmahiczyk ed., 2d ed. 1990); see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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have the competence to ask the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the legality of the
use of nuclear weapons or anything else for that matter. Section v is of such a
vague and broad nature that almost no action can be ruled as impermissible if
necessary to attain the objective of the organization. 2  Similarly, the WHO
"objective" is also stated so broadly that the action taken could, in theory, be in
furtherance of any remotely health-related goal. 3 It stands to reason that the
language contained in the WHO's objective and in Article 2(v) are not indicative
of the WHO's competence.
V. THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCrION OF THE ICJ AND ADVISORY OPINIONS.
While the ability of the WHO to request an advisory opinion is unquestion-
able, s4 it is not absolute with respect to the kinds of questions it may pose.
85
The ICJ, which heard its first dispute in 1947,86 retains the discretion to decide
whether it will give an advisory opinion. 7 There are several factors that the
ICJ will consider when deciding to give an advisory opinion. First, it is
necessary to consider the circumstances under which the ICJ will refuse to give
an advisory opinion. The relevant grounds for refusal are: "the 'political' nature
of the question posed, . . . the 'abstract' nature of the question .... [and] the
absence of consent on the part of a state immediately concerned.
' 88
The ICJ is seldom asked for advisory opinions" and has never refused togive an advisory opinion.90 However, the Permanent International Court of
82. WHO CONST. art. 2, 1 v, reprinted in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1035 (Edmund Jan Osmaficzyk ed., 2d ed. 1990).
83. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
85. The WHO may ask the ICJ for advisory opinions "arising within the scope of its competence other
than questions concerning mutual relationships of the Organization and the United Nations or other specialized
agencies." Agreement Between the United Nations and the World Health Organization, supra note 64, at 202.
86. In its fast decision, the Court found that:
Albania had mined-or knew of the mining of-part of Albanian territorial waters and had failed to
give notice thereof to other nations required by the Eighth Hague Convention of 1907. A British ship
had consequently been destroyed. When the ICJ ordered Albania to compensate the United
Kingdom, Albania flatly refused.
Heidi K. Hubbard, Separation of Powers Within the United Nations: A Revised Role for the International Court
of Justice, 38 STAN. L. REV. 165, 174 (1985).
87. ICHLA POMERANCE, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IN THE LEAGUE AND
U.N. ERAS 281 (1973).
88. Id. at 279.
89. Stephen M. Schwebel, Widening the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
Without Amending Its Statute, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 355, 358 (1984).
It is a reflection of the intensely political character of the Security Council and the General Assembly
that they have resorted to the Court under paragraph one of article 96 only fourteen times between
1946 and 1983 and that, for their part, the numerous specialized agencies of the United Nations have
had recourse to the Court only three times in all. In contrast, the Council of the League of Nations
has made requests to the Permanent Court of International Justice which, in about half that period,
resulted in twenty-seven advisory opinions.
Id.
90. POMERANCE, supra note 87, at 281.
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Justice (PCU) 9' set the precedent for refusing to give an advisory opinion. In
the case of Eastern Carelia, the PCIJ refused to give an advisory opinion due to
"nonmembership in the League of one of the disputants and that disputant's
failure to agree to, or be represented in, the proceedings of the Court."' In
Eastern Carelia, "the League of Nations Council requested an advisory opinion
from the Permanent Court of International Justice as to whether the 1920 Peace
Treaty between Finland and Russia, and an annexed Russian Declaration
regarding the autonomy of Eastern Carelia, placed Russia under an obligation to
Finland to carry out the provisions contained therein."93  Russia, then not a
member of the League of Nations, refused to participate when the matter came
before the PCIJ.' The Court, "reasoning that no nation could be required
without its consent to submit to a specific settlement" found it "impossible to
give its opinion on a dispute of this kind." 95 This decision falls into one of the
listed grounds for refusing to give an advisory opinion, namely "the absence of
consent on the part of a state immediately concerned."'
Further grounds for refusing to give an advisory opinion by the ICJ, are the
"political" and "abstract" nature of the question.' In the first instance, the
WHO request can easily be seen as a political question. As evidenced in the
1993 meetings of Committee B, many of the delegates and Dr. Piel, the WHO's
own legal counsel, viewed the proposed draft as "a political act outside the
mandate of the WHO."9 As previously stated, the studying of and reporting
on nuclear war seemed to fall squarely within the mandate of the WHO.
However, the two WHO reports on the effects of nuclear war expressly stated
that the political steps towards the prevention of nuclear war were not within the
91. The Permanent Court of International Justice of 1922:
was a cherished objective of the peace movement of that era. A tenet of that movement was that war
could be prevented by the processes of international arbitration and adjudication. The theory was that
such civilized ways of settling disputes could displace the physical force of war. . . . Just as a
common law court has developed common law in the process of rendering judgments, so the World
Court develops international law in the process of rendering its judgments and in giving advisory
opinions to the League of Nations.
Stephen M. Schwebel, The Docket and Decisionmaking Process of the International Court of Justice, 13
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 543, 544-45 (1990).
92. POMERANCE, supra note 87, at 289 (referring to the Status of East Carelia (Fin. v. U.S.S.R.), 1923
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5 (July 23)).
93. Richard Thigpen, Resolution of Conflicts Between National and Transnational Legal Prescriptions-A
Case Review and Assessment, 25 How. L.J. 635, 638 (1982).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 639. The Court stated:
It is well established in international law that no State can without its consent, be compelled to
submit its dispute with other states to mediation or arbitration, or to any kind of pacific settlement
.... As concerns states not members of the League, they are not bound by the Covenant. The
submission, therefore, of a dispute between them and a member of the League for solution according
to the methods provided for in the Covenant could take place only by virtue of that consent. Such
consent, however, has not been given by Russia. On the contrary, Russia has, on several occasions,
clearly declared that it accepts no intervention by the League of Nations....
Id. (quoting The Status of East Carelia (Fin. v. U.S.S.R.), 1923 P.C.IJ. (ser. B) No. 5, at 28 (July 23)).
96. See POMERANCE, supra note 87, at 279.
97. Id.
98. FORTY-SIXTH WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY, supra note 30, at 259.
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purview of the Committee (1st report), the Management Group (2d report), or
the WHO (both reports).99
The political nature of the WHO's request is not the only ground for denial
by the ICJ. The wording of the WHO request can also be seen as too abstract
for the ICJ to adequately render an opinion. Nowhere in the language of the
request is there any limitation or exception to the use of nuclear weapons."
The question is simply too broad.
If the ICJ were to give an advisory opinion, an affirmative or negative
decision would leave many important questions unanswered. If the use of
nuclear weapons by a State in war or other conflict was found to be illegal by
the ICJ, how could the ICJ give force to its decision?'"' If the ICJ found the
use of nuclear weapons to be legal when used by a State in war or other conflict,
could the United Nations legally control the production of nuclear weapons in
States that do not currently possess them? Considering that ICJ's past advisory
opinions have been favorably received by the organs that requested them, how
would those nations which currently possess nuclear weapons respond to a
finding of illegality?"~ It is clear that merely deciding to give the requested
advisory opinion, much less the actual opinion itself, could cause great confusion
with both the United Nations and international law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The issue of nuclear weapons possession and their use has been a central
one in the arena of international law since its arrival. The issue is as complex
and important as it is ambiguous and convoluted. While great strides since
World War II have been made to protect the world from the effects of nuclear
war, much more work needed. Most would agree that the devastating effects of
nuclear weapons should be avoided at all costs. However, the methods for
achieving this end should be carefully examined. The United Nations, to work
effectively, requires that Member States are in agreement with its mandates.
Without acquiescence, there can be no solid international law. Any disruption
of this delicate balance between the Member States of the United Nations would
negatively effect international law. The WHO's request for an advisory
opinion from the ICJ concerning the legality of nuclear weapons use could
conceivably disrupt this balance. Questions concerning the WHO's competence
to ask for an opinion of this nature and the ambiguity of the question itself have
99. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
100. See ICJ Communiqu6 No. 93/26 (1993).
101. Even if the ICJ makes a judgment instead of an advisory opinion, questions will arise as to the Court's
enforcement capabilities.
The Court is not in a position to order sovereign states about, as a national court is in a position to
govern the participation of ordinary parties in the usual run of litigation... [Miost legal disputes
between states do not come before the Court and some of the disputes which have, resulted in
judgments which the losing party has not carried out. So the Court is not a fully effective institution.
I do not think you can compare its status, its influence, with the supreme courts of some countries.
Schwebel, supra note 91, at 552, 557. See also Ago, supra note 14.
102. "In no case did a requesting organ refuse to accept and act upon the judicial advice rendered-though.
in some instances, initial insistence on absolute compliance with the Court's opinion was followed by
subsequent tactical retreats." POMERANCI, supra note 87, at 341.
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and will continue to divide the member States of the United Nations. If the ICJ
decides to give the advisory opinion, the United Nations could be further
divided. Therefore, the ICJ should give serious thought to the validity of the
WHO's request.
While the issue of nuclear weapons continues to plague international law
and while a consensus is needed to avoid their use, the correct methods for
achieving this end cannot be overlooked. The answers lie within the Security
Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, not the WHO.
Martin M. Strahan

